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JUSTICE BRENNAN AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES:
THE CONCEPT OF A "LIVING CONSTITUTION"
ARIN M. ADAmSt
In a speech addressing the use of history in constitutional
interpretation, Justice William J. Brennan emphasized that the
Constitution is a living document subject to "contemporary
ratification" and that the judiciary must interpret the text to
promote human dignity in light of society's changing values and
needs.1 He stressed that it is this continual change in societal
needs and relationships over time that often renders ineffective the
pursuit for "the intention of the Framers" on contemporary issues,
and he noted that "[i]t is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage
we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of
principle to specific, contemporary questions."
2
This view of the Constitution as a living and evolving document
whose interpretation should not be cabined by too literal a quest for
the Framers' intent3 is a position that Justice Brennan consistently
defended and thoughtfully espoused in his opinions regarding the
first amendment religion clauses. It constitutes one of the many
contributions by this great jurist.
While Justice Brennan made many contributions to numerous
facets of the law in his thirty-four year tenure on the Court,4 his
opinions in the area of religion most prominently display his stance
that the America of the founding fathers was different from the
America of today and that the Bill of Rights must be read in a way
that reflects this change. Specifically, Justice Brennan's decisions in
t Counsel to Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, retired Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, who gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Lori S. Cozen, Esq., in the preparation of this Article.
' Speech byJustice Brennan at Georgetown University, The Constitution of the
United States: Contemporary Ratification (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in A. MASON &
D. STEPHENSON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 607 (1987) [hereinafter Brennan];
see also A. ADAMs & C. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE
CONSTrUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 36 (1990).
2 Brennan, supra note 1, at 609.
3 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
4Justice Minton retired from the United States Supreme Court on October 15,
1956, and Justice Brennan filled his vacant seat the next day.
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School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,5 Sherbert v. Verner,6
Marsh v. Chambers,7 Lynch v. Donnelly,8 and County of Allegheny v.
ACLU9 are worthy of note because they evince his desire to
preserve the autonomy and diversity of religious groups in Ameri-
ca,10 a desire which often was minimized by other members of the
Court, but which Justice Brennan constantly sought to fulfill in his
role as defender, as he saw it, of a "living Constitution."
The religion clauses of the first amendment preclude Congress
from passing any law "respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."" It is in these provisions,
referred to as the establishment and free exercise clauses, that
constitutional concepts of religious autonomy were first articulated.
The Court has extended the clauses' textual proscription of federal
governmental conduct to state and local governments as well.
12
In his opinions on the religion clauses, Justice Brennan
frequently focused on whether the contemporary practice at issue
conflicted with the fundamental meaning of the first amend-
ment.13 While accepting historical evidence as an aid to answering
contemporary questions, he admonished that the use of such
evidence should be circumscribed.1 4 Brennan's opinions in the
religion clause controversies reveal his respect for religious
autonomy and, consequently, his concern that government not
become impermissibly involved with religion.
Sherbert v. Verner,15 a case decided under the free exercise
clause, demonstrates Brennan's position that government must not
place a substantial burden on an individual's free exercise rights.
16
5 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
6 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
7 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (BrennanJ., dissenting).
8 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (BrennanJ., dissenting).
9 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3124 (1989) (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
10 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1295-98 (1988).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that the free
exercise of religion is embraced by the concept of liberty in the fourteenth
amendment); see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (holding that
neither a state nor the federal government could set up a church or pass laws that aid
religIon or prefer one religion over another).
'P See Ray,Justice Brennan and dhe Jurisprudence of Dissent 61 TEMP. L. REv. 307,
331 (1988).
14 See id. at 331.
' 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16 See id. at 404.
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Sherbert concerned a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
who was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she
would not work on Saturday, the sabbath day of her faith. Unable
to obtain other employment because of her conscientious objection
to Saturday work, Adell Sherbert filed a claim for unemployment
compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act. The Act provided that a claimant was ineligible
for benefits if she failed, without cause, to accept suitable work that
had been offered. The Unemployment Commission denied her
claim on the ground that she would not accept suitable work, but
the Supreme Court, in an opinion by justice Brennan, held that the
denial of benefits abridged Sherbert's constitutional right to the free
exercise of her religion.
17
Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan addressed primarily two
questions in reaching his conclusion. First, he considered whether
Sherbert's disqualification as a beneficiary represented an infringe-
ment by the state on her free exercise rights. Second, he examined
whether some compelling state interest justified the substantial
infringement of the employee's first amendment rights.18 Justice
Brennan concluded that the statute imposed a burden on Sherbert's
free exercise rights because it forced her to choose between
following the tenets of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, or abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to work, on the other hand.19 Further, he determined there
was no "compelling state interest" present in the statute's eligibility
provisions thatjustified an infringement of Sherbert's constitutional
right to religious freedom,20 and he noted that the state did not
demonstrate that there could be no "less restrictive" way of
preventing fraudulent claims by persons feigning religious objec-
tions to Saturday work as a pretext for laziness.
21
The Sherbert opinion sets forth the proposition that an indivi-
dual's right to religious freedom should not be delimited by
government, unless government has a compelling reason for such
an abridgement and demonstrates that there is no "less restrictive"
17 See id. at 410.
18 See id. at 403.
19 See id. at 404. But see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (holding,
contrary to Brennan's dissent, that the free exercise clause does not constitutionally
require an exception from Sunday closing laws for those who on religious grounds
observe a different day of rest).20 See Sherber4 374 U.S. at 406-07.
21 See id. at 407.
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way of accomplishing the goal. Brennan perceptively observed that
"[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the libert[y] of religion...
may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a
benefit or privilege." 22 Justice Brennan's disinclination, in Sherbert,
to allow any type of governmental imposition upon an individual's
free exercise rights manifests his desire to preserve religious
autonomy in America.
On the same day the Court announced its ruling in Sherbert, it
handed down its decision in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp.23 Justice Brennan did not write for the majority in
Schempp but instead filed a lengthy concurring opinion which
provides "a comprehensive and illuminating survey" of the problems
raised under the establishment clause of the first amendment.
24
Schempp dealt with a Pennsylvania statute that required Bible
reading in public schools but permitted the excusal of students
upon their parents' request. The Court noted that "[t]hese
exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular activities of
students who are required by law to attend school," 25 and it held
such official mandate of religious activity and pressure on a captive
audience rendered the provisions unconstitutional under the
establishment clause. 26 The Court also found that the excusal
provision could not validate the exercises.
27
Justice Brennan detailed at considerable length his reasons for
joining the Court's judgment. In his discussion of the meaning of
the first amendment, Brennan argued for placing less reliance than
the majority would place on the historical approach to deciding
establishment clause cases, pointing out that "an awareness of
22 Id. at 404. Justice Brennan made this statement in recognition of the fact that
the South Carolina court's construction of the statute could not be saved from
constitutional infirmity on the basis that unemployment benefits were not the
appellant's "right" but merely a "privilege." See id.
23 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
24 See Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, 1963
RELIGION & PUB. ORD. 3, 6.
25 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 224-25. The Court concluded that the program was unconstitutional
in light of its earlier holding in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See Schempp, 374
U.S. at 224-25. In that case, school principals were directed to require each class to
read aloud a prayer, composed by the State Board of Regents, at the beginning of the
school day. See Enge4 370 U.S. at 422. The Court noted that it was "no part of the
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American
people to recite," and therefore the school board's action in prescribing the daily
recitation was an impermissible establishment of religion. See id. at 425.
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history and an appreciation of the aims of the founding fathers do
not always resolve concrete problems."28 He argued that recorded
history frequently is ambiguous and that statements readily can be
found to support conflicting interpretations of the establishment
clause.
29
Brennan also recognized in Schempp that American education
has changed substantially since the first amendment was adopted,
and thus "any views of the eighteenth century as to whether the
exercises at bar are an 'establishment' offer little aid to deci-
sion."30 He further observed that religion in America today is
much more pluralistic than it was in the America of our forefathers
because of the growing diversity in religious beliefs and practices in
the latter part of the twentieth century.31  Consequently, he
concluded that the Court's interpretation of the first amendment
must be responsive to the much more provocative nature of
religious questions in contemporary society, noting that "[w]hatever
Jefferson or Madison would have thought of Bible reading or the
recital of the Lord's Prayer in what few public schools existed in
their day, our use of the history of their time must limit itself to
broad purposes, not specific practices."3 2 In Schempp, therefore,
Justice Brennan made the "sensible, but not necessarily obvious"
33
point that many of today's problems were not envisioned by the
Framers, and thus "too literal [a] quest for the advice of the
Founding Fathers... [is often] futile."3
While Justice Brennan was frequently in the majority in cases
construing the religion clauses in the sixties, in the eighties he often
found himself dissenting. Marsh v. Chambers35 and Lynch v.
Donnelly3 6 represent two illustrations of Justice Brennan's break
with the majority in this critical area. In Marsh, Ernest Chambers,
a member of the Nebraska legislature, brought suit challenging the
legislature's practice of selecting and paying a chaplain to offer
28 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Comment, School
Prayer and the Constitution: Silence is Golden, 48 MD. L. REV. 1018, 1024-25 & n.36
(1989).
2 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 237-38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
so Id. at 238.
S See id. at 240.
32 Id. at 241.
33 Pollak, The Supreme Cour 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REv. 62, 69 (1963).
34 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring).
35 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
36 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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prayers at the beginning of each session.3 7 The Supreme Court
upheld the Nebraska chaplaincy program, noting that for almost two
hundred years the United States Congress has opened each session
with a prayer and that the same practice has persisted in Nebraska
and other states for more than a century.3 8  While the Court
recognized that "[s]tanding alone, historical patterns cannot justify
contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees,"3 9 it found
support for its holding in the fact that the same Congress that
drafted and approved the first amendment also appointed and paid
a congressional chaplain. The Court concluded, therefore, that it
would be "incongruous to interpret [the establishment clause] as
imposing more stringent First Amendment limits on the states" than
Congress imposed on itself.
40
In dissenting, Justice Brennan began his exegesis by admitting
that although he had expressed a position similar to that of the
majority in his concurring opinion in Schempp, he now realized that
such a position-one of tolerance for legislative prayer4 -was
"wrong."42 Justice Brennan proceeded to note with disapproval
the majority's use of history to resolve conclusively the issue of
legislative prayers. 43 He asserted that the majority was "misguid-
37 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 785.
38 See id. at 788-89.
39 Id. at 790.
40 Id. at 790-91.
41 In Schempp, Justice Brennan had stated:
The saying of invocational prayers in legislative chambers, state or federal,
and the appointment of legislative chaplains, might well represent no
involvements of the kind prohibited by the Establishment Clause.
Legislators, federal and state, are mature adults who may presumably absent
themselves from such public and ceremonial exercises without incurringany
penalty, direct or indirect.
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299-300 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
42 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan's forthright
acknowledgement that his position on legislative prayer was misguided in Schempp,
brings to mind the perceptive words ofJustice Frankfurter: "Wisdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late." Henslee v.
Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
43 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 815-16 (Brennan,J., dissenting). At the time the Court
decided the legislative prayer issue in Marsh, it already had adopted a three-part test,
which was articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under the Lemon
test, a law does not violate the establishment clause if it has a secular purpose, the
primary effect of the law is not to advance or inhibit religion, and the law does not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. See id. at 612-13. Justice
Brennan contended that the Court should have applied the Lemon test to the facts in
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ed" when it relied on the fact that chaplains were employed by the
first Congress at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted as the basis
of its holding, explaining that "the Constitution is not a static
document whose meaning on every detail is fixed for all time by the
life experience of the Framers." 44 Furthermore, he pointed out
that in interpreting cases under the establishment clause, the Court
must recognize the important principle of religious freedom in a
pluralistic society: "The Establishment Clause embodies a judg-
ment, born of a long and turbulent history, that, in our society,
religion 'must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and
the institutions of private choice.'"
45
In Lynch v. Donnelly,46 Justice Brennan was again at odds with
the majority's interpretation of the establishment clause. The
setting had changed from legislative prayer in Marsh to a govern-
ment-sponsored nativity scene in Lynch. Still, Brennan found
himself trying to persuade the Court to temper its reading of history
with the recognition that American culture today is considerably
different from what it was at the time of the Framers.
Lynch involved the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, which each
year erected a Christmas display in a downtown shopping district.
The display included, among other things, a Santa Claus house, a
Christmas tree, candy-striped poles, and a life-sized nativity
scene.47 Certain Pawtucket residents challenged the constitution-
ality of the presentation of the nativity scene, or "creche," in the
annual display. The Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals,
held that the inclusion of the creche did not violate the establish-
ment clause.48 Although the Court conceded that the creche had
Marsh instead of applying a purely historical analysis. Had the Court applied this test,
stressed Brennan, "it would have [had] to strike [legislative prayer] down as a clear
violation of the Establishment Clause." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).44 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 816 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Brennan also pointed out that,
concerning constitutional interpretation, Congress is not always as careful as the
Supreme Court: "Legislators, influenced by the passions and exigencies of the
moment, the pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of business, do
not always pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of legislation they enact,
and this must be assumed to be as true of the Members of the First Congress as any
other." Id. at 814-15 (footnote omitted).
45 Id. at 802 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)).
46 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
47 The nativityscene consisted of the traditional figures, including the infantJesus,
Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals, all ranging in height from
five inches to five feet. See id. at 671.
48 See id. at 687.
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religious significance, it concluded that the city had a legitimate
secular purpose in displaying it. It stated that the creche should be
viewed in the context of the Christmas holiday season and, as such,
its secular purpose became apparent in that the creche "depicts the
historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a
National Holiday."49 The majority also declared that the creche
did not advance religion any more than did lending textbooks to
parochial school students or granting tax deductions to religious
groups; these activities had already been held valid under the
establishment clause. 50  Finally, considering the question of
entanglement, the Court held that the presence of political
divisiveness was not sufficient to invalidate otherwise permissible
conduct.
51
Justice Brennan sharply criticized the Court's holding, stating
that nothing in the history of Christmas celebrations or the setting
in which the city's creche was presented "obscures or diminishes the
plain fact that Pawtucket's action amounts to an impermissible gov-
ernmental endorsement of a particular faith."5 2 He pointed out
that the nativity scene was central to the Christian faith, and,
therefore, it was clearly distinct in its purpose and effect from the
rest of the Christmas display because it was the only part of the
display rooted in a biblical account of Christ's birth.53 Justice
Brennan further argued that there was no support for the majority's
49 Id. at 680. The Court appeared to analyze Pawtucket's action under the Lemon
test. Justice Brennan, however, pointed out in his dissent that the Court was applying
a less than rigorous application of the Lemon test. See id. at 696 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of the three-part Lemon test, see supra note 43.
50 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-82.
5' See id. at 683-85.
52 Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan stated that Pawtucket's actions
clearly violated the Lemon test and that the majority's loose interpretation of the test
suggested that the majority's commitment to separatism may only be superficial. See
id. at 697-98; see also Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARv. L. REv. 87, 177 (1984)
(noting Brennan's criticism of the majority's religious endorsement and its narrow
application of the Lemon test).
53 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan noted that the
nativity scene "is the chief symbol of the characteristically Christian belief that a
divine Savior was brought into the world and that the purpose of this miraculous
birth was to illuminate a path toward salvation and redemption." Id. (footnote
omitted). Accordingly, Brennan concluded that "[w]hen government appears to
sponsor such religiously inspired views, we cannot say that the practice is '"so separate
and so indisputedly marked off from the religious function"... that [it] may fairly
be viewed as reflect[ing] a neutral posture toward religious institutions.'" Id. at 708-
09 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782 (1973) (quoting
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1946))).
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use of historical evidence as proof that nativity scenes in govern-
mental celebrations of Christmas have been accepted through time
and thus did not violate the establishment clause. 54 Rather,
Brennan observed that at the time of adoption of the Constitution,
and well into the nineteenth century, there was "no settled pattern
of celebrating Christmas, either as a purely religious holiday or as
a public event."55
Although Justice Brennan recognized that an awareness of
historical practice can provide a useful guide in interpreting the
establishment clause, he cautioned that the use of such evidence is
appropriate only when the evidence refers specifically to the
challenged practice.56 Under the facts in Lynch, however, Ameri-
can historical experience concerning the celebration of Christmas
does not support the validation of a government-sponsored nativity
scene. Instead, he stressed, history reveals that the Framers of the
establishment clause understood that "'religion is too personal, too
sacred, too holy to permit its "unhallowed perversion" by civil
[authorities].' 57 Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that instead
of recognizing government's proper role with respect to religion,
the majority reminded us that religious insensitivity still exists.
58
A reading of Justice Brennan's dissenting opinions in Marsh and
Lynch reveals his commitment to protect religious pluralism in
America. He recognized that in determining the constitutionality
of contemporary practices under the establishment clause, the Court
must not look solely to the historical background of the first
amendment, but instead it must recognize the importance of
America's increasing religious diversity. Commenting on the
challenge the Court faces in establishment clause cases, Justice
Brennan noted in Marsh that "[o]ur primary task must be to
translate 'the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as
part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century,
into concrete restraints on officials dealing with problems of the
Twentieth Century.'" 59
54 See id. at 718.
55 Id. at 720.
-6 See id. at 718-19, 725.57 Id. at 725 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962)).58 See id. at 725-26; Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr.Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L.J. 770, 787.
59 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816-17 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
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More recently, in County of Allegheny v. ACL U,6 Justice Bren-
nan declared that the Court's establishment clause analysis disclosed
its continuing misunderstanding of "pluralism" in present-day
society.6 1 In Allegheny, the Supreme Court addressed once again
the issue that it had confronted in Lynch-whether governmental
displays of religious symbols violate the concept of separation of
church and state under the first amendment.
Allegheny dealt with the constitutionality of two religious displays
located on governmental property in Pittsburgh. The first involved
a creche placed on the "Grand Staircase" of the Allegheny County
Courthouse; this nativity scene included figures representingJesus,
Mary, Joseph, shepherds, the wise men, farm animals, and an angel
holding a banner declaring "Gloria in Excelsis Deo," meaning
"Glory to God in the Highest."62 The second display consisted of
a forty-five foot Christmas tree next to an eighteen-foot menorah on
the steps leading to the main entrance of the city-county building,
located a block away from the courthouse. 63  This display also
included, at the bottom of the tree, a sign proclaiming Pittsburgh's
devotion to liberty and to the legacy of freedom during the holiday
season.
The Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties
Union and seven local residents alleged that each display violated
the establishment clause, and the group sought a permanent
injunction against display of both the creche and the menorah.6 4
A divided Supreme Court, speaking throughJustice Blackmun, held
that the presence of the creche demonstrated that the county took
a position on the question of religion, amounting to an unconstitu-
tional endorsement of the Christian faith.65 The Court further
60 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
61 See id. at 3129 (Brennan J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62 See id. at 3093-94 & n.5. The creche had been displayed on the Grand Staircase
each year since 1981 by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group. There was
a sign stating that the display was donated by the Holy Name Society. The creche was
the setting for the county's annual Christmas carol program. See id. at 3093-94.
63 See id. at 3097. The menorah in Allegheny was owned by ajewish group called
Chabad, but it was erected and removed each year by the city. See id. "Menorah" is
the Hebrew word for candelabrum, and the lighting of the menorah commemorates
the ewish observance of Chanukah. See id. at 3095-97 & n.11.
See id. at 3097-98. The district court, relying on Lynch, held that neither display
conveyed a message of governmental endorsement of religion. See id. at 3090. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court decision, holding
that the displays were governmental endorsements of the faiths they represented and,
therefore, were unconstitutional. See ACLU v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655,
663 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
65 See Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3"115. The Court, discussing Lynch, noted that the
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held that because the menorah was situated near both a Christmas
tree, a secular symbol of the holiday season, and a sign saluting
liberty, it was not indicative of a government preference for any
particular religion and not violative of the establishment clause.
66
Instead, the Court concluded that, taken in its entirety, the menorah
display was Pittsburgh's secular acknowledgement of cultural
diversity in celebration of the "winter-holiday season."
67
Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's judgment holding the
display of the creche unconstitutional but dissented from the
decision that upheld the display of the menorah.68 He criticized
the Court's judgment relating to the menorah as resting on unsound
logic. 69 First, rejecting the Court's assertion that the Christmas
tree is essentially a secular symbol, Brennan stated that the Court's
"attempt to take the 'Christmas' out of the Christmas tree is
unconvincing." 70  Even if a Christmas tree could be viewed as a
secular symbol, reasoned Brennan, such a characterization would
not be appropriate when the tree is displayed next to "such a
forthrightly religious symbol" as the menorah.71  Thus, Justice
Brennan concluded that the effect of the display was not a diminu-
tion of the religious character of the menorah, as the Court found,
but rather an enhancement of the religious nature of the Christmas
tree.
72
location of the creche in a privately owned park and the presence of secular figures
and decorations distinguished the Lynch display from the Allegheny County's creche,
which stood alone in a government building. The Court maintained that because the
creche was not surrounded by a larger secular display, nothing diminished its purely
relious message. See id. at 3103-04.
See id. at 3095, 3116. Specifically, Justice Blackmun determined that the
menorah, although a religious object, acquired secular meaningby being placed next
to a secular object, the Christmas tree, which transferred secular meaning to the
menorah. See id. at 3113-14. Justice Blackmun concluded, therefore, that the objects
from both religions, as well as the sign saluting liberty, made it unlikely that an
average viewer of the display would see it as an endorsement of religion. See id. at
3115.
67 Id. at 3114.
68 See id. at 3124 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69 See id. at 3125.
7 0 
id.
71 Id. at 3126.
72 See id. at 3126-27; Comment, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos
in Establishment ClauseAnalysis, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 503,530-31 (1990). Justice Brennan
determined that the menorah's clear religious message would dominate the vague
message presented by the Christmas tree. See Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3127 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Second, Justice Brennan sharply criticized the Court's finding
that Chanukah is a holiday with secular dimensions, symbolized by
the menorah. He stated that he could not "accept the effort to
transform an emblem of religious faith into the innocuous 'symbol
for a holiday that ... has both religious and secular dimen-
sions.'" T- Finally, Justice Brennan dismissed the Court's conten-
tion that the display of the menorah, the Christmas tree, and the
sign advanced pluralism.74 In this respect, Brennan argued that
even if the menorah display promotes a "pluralism" of beliefs, the
display is still unconstitutional, since the establishment clause
requires neutrality, notjust among religions, but between religion
and nonreligion. 75 Justice Brennan concluded by pointing out that
the Court's decision rested on the unsound premise that the govern-
ment may promote pluralism by sponsoring or condoning displays
having strong religious associations on its property. 76 He added:
"This is not 'pluralism' as I understand it."
77
In Allegheny, as in Marsh and Lynch, Justice Brennan concluded
that once again the Court had failed to meet its obligation under
the establishment clause to respect and defend our religious
diversity as a nation. To him, the Court's holding in Allegheny that
the menorah display was constitutional revealed simply that the
Court was still not up to the challenge of interpreting the establish-
ment clause in light of society's changing values and needs.
78
What, then, is Justice Brennan's lesson in interpreting the
religion clauses? Rejection of historical perspective in this area
would be an overstatement of his view, just as focusing solely upon
contemporary values would be too myopic. Rather, what Justice
Brennan has provided, as seen through his interpretations of the
religion clauses, is a grand scheme or majestic perception of the
Constitution. His stance is one in which sensitivity replaces
dogmatic rules, and a view in which continuum resides; one which
honors original intent and, yet, adapts it to contemporary issues;
73 Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3128 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting the majority opinion).
74 See id.
75 See id. Justice Brennan explained that he knew of "no principle under the
Establishment Clause... that permits us to conclude that governmental promotion
of religion is acceptable so long as one religion is not favored." Id.
76 See id. at 3125, 3128-29.
77 Id. at 3129.
78 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 609 (advocating dynamic constitutional
interpretation which encompasses social progress and changing social circumstances).
THE RELIGION CLA USES
one which permits the judicial interpreter to breathe deeply and see
broadly. As he stated:
But the ultimate question must be, what do the works of the text
mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not in
any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and
gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with
current problems and current needs 9
Such is the heritage of Justice Brennan in one of the most impor-
tant and most hallowed of the Constitution's protections.
79 Id. at 610.
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